Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Asia (Western Asia).

Arabic.

38.4 million (2023 estimate).

Retentionist.

2024.

Stoning.

Public stoning can be used to execute minors and adults for adultery. The condemned person is buried up to their chest or knees and a group of people throw stones at the person until they die. There are no recent documented executions by stoning in Saudi Arabia, but Saudi Arabia’s secrecy regarding the death penalty makes it difficult to determine when the last execution by stoning took place.

Shooting.

A third type of execution in Saudi Arabia is by firing squad. In 2013, an inter-ministerial committee considered replacing beheadings with firing squads due to the lack of swordsmen available. The committee stated that execution by firing squad does not violate Shari’a law. However, Saudi Arabia also recruited more swordsmen to carry out the increased number of executions. There are no recent documented executions by firing squad, but Saudi Arabia’s secrecy regarding the death penalty makes it difficult to identify the most recent execution by firing squad.

Comments.

Most executions in Saudi Arabia are public, but recently the use of the death penalty in Saudi Arabi has become more secretive and opaque. Oftentimes the families of those executed are not given advanced warning. When an execution is public, attendees are banned from taking photos or videos. Despite the ban, footage of public executions is sometimes released, for example in 2008  and 2015.Execution dates s are often chosen arbitrarily and in secret. If the governor thinks the death rate in the area should be increased or if authorities determine the need for a  deterrent for a specific crime, they might order an execution. Due to the arbitrary timing of executions, some inmates are only informed of their execution 24 hours before it occurs.

Beheading.

There were at least 21 people on death row at the end of 2022.

(This question was last updated on Nov. 7, 2023.).

No.

In February 2020, there was an official moratorium on executions for drug-related offenses; however, that moratorium was lifted in October 2022  allowing those convicted of drug-related offenses to be sentenced to death.
.

Saudi Arabia's Basic Law incorporates the Quran and Sunna as the nation’s constitution and provides that “[the] State protects human rights in accordance with the Islamic Shari’a.” Describing what this means is somewhat complicated by the advent of Wahhabism and then Salafism, which diminish the importance of the juristic schools in determining law. This is problematic when describing the laws of a country like Saudi Arabia, hailed as the “accredited centre of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence,” but actually the flashpoint of Wahhabism and Salafism. However, some principles of law may be common. Shari’a law historically recognizes certain principles that can be thought of as fundamental constitutional principles of law. Those that relate to the death penalty include legality and non-retroactivity, the presumption of innocence and the requirements of a fair trial, habeus corpus and judicial review. The Arab Charter on Human Rights (which Saudi Arabia has ratified) is consistent with Shari’a principles, and recognizes the right to a fair trial and not to be arbitrarily deprived of life, among other rights.

Aggravated Murder.

Aggravated murder may be punishable by death as both hadd and qisas. This offense may include (but not be limited to) offenses such as murder during robbery or murder involving seclusion, treachery, or other methods rendering the victim helpless (or that have the effect of spreading terror)—in this case, the murder may be punished by death as hadd. This may not be the Hanbali position, but one Al-Adl (a journal published by the Saudi Ministry of Justice) article adopted this position.

Murder.

Murder is punishable by death as qisas. “Islamic law presumes that any sane person who intentionally kills a person with a weapon, is a sinner deserving perdition according to the Qur’an and that the murderer is subject to retaliation.” Murder is punishable by death as qisas (retaliation) or diya (compensation instead of execution), but there is some disagreement over which circumstances allow qisas. According to the Hanbali schools of Sunni Islam, the offender is subject to death as qisas if “the killer intended to kill and employed some means likely to have that result.” It is also possible that courts might apply the principle that intentional killing or intentional infliction of serious and permanent bodily harm allows application of the talion principle and therefore the death penalty if the offense results in death.
.

Other Offenses Resulting in Death.

Killing without intent may be punishable by death as hadd, but probably not as qisas. This offense may include (but might not be limited to) robbery resulting in death. For most schools, including the Hanbali school, all participants in a group robbery resulting in death were punishable by death, regardless of cause or intent.

Terrorism-Related Offenses Resulting in Death.

By Fatwa issued on August 30, 1988, acts of terrorism (as “corruption on earth”) carry the mandatory death penalty; the ambit of this Fatwa is unclear. The description of this offense as “corruption on earth” suggests that the penalty may be hadd. “Contemporary scholars of Islamic Shari’a adopt the view that terrorism is included under the crime of hiraba, or waging war against God and his Apostle and making or spreading corruption on earth,” although analysis on this matter has not been comprehensive, and the position seems more developed by the Maliki school of Sunni Islam and the Shi’a schools than by the Hanbali school.

Terrorism-Related Offenses Not Resulting in Death.

By Fatwa issued on August 30, 1988, acts of terrorism (as “corruption on earth”) may carry the mandatory death penalty; the Fatwa does not specify that such acts must result in death, and its ambit is unclear. The description of this offense as “corruption on earth” could suggest that the penalty is hadd, although it would not be traditional in the Hanbali school (or most schools of Sunni Islam) to apply the death penalty as hadd for non-lethal corruption on earth.

Rape Not Resulting in Death.

Rape is punishable by death as hadd or ta’zir, depending on the circumstances. For a fuller explanation, see our comments—because the evidentiary requirements for this hadd are demanding, it is more likely that the death penalty is applied as ta’zir for aggravated rape. For instance, rape is reported to result in the death penalty, and further investigation shows that the offender was a serial rapist who secluded and robbed his victims.

Robbery Not Resulting in Death.

Robbery is punishable by death as hadd, but in most schools (including the Hanbali school) only when resulting in death. Otherwise, the death penalty might apply as ta’zir under circumstances such as recidivism or where the offense is aggravated. For instance, a group armed robbery in which a woman was bound, gagged and held at knifepoint in her home and an offense involving rape and armed robbery led to executions, reportedly, at least in part on the grounds of armed robbery. For a fuller explanation, see our comments.

Arson Not Resulting in Death.

Some forms of arson might carry a statutory death penalty under a Fatwa on terrorism-related activities.

Burglary Not Resulting in Death.

Burglary can be punished by death as ta’zir under the Hanbali school (and others) of Sunni Islam when there are aggravating circumstances, including recidivism. Burglary has been punished by death when it resulted in armed robbery.

Drug Trafficking Not Resulting in Death.

The death penalty may be imposed for drug smuggling and for importing, exporting, manufacturing, extracting or growing drugs and narcotics with the intention of trafficking. Further, complicity in the commission of any of these offenses carries the death penalty. Capital punishment may also be imposed for the second offense of circulating drugs “by selling, offering, distributing, delivering, receiving or transporting.”

Drug Possession.

Receiving narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances carries the death penalty.

Adultery.

An article published in Al-Adl indicates that not all Saudi appellate courts agree on the correct application of narcotics laws to those who possess drugs—some arguing that those who possess requisite amounts should be presumed to be engaged in trafficking, others arguing that possession should be considered trafficking based on other factors. (A finding of trafficking could trigger the death penalty under Royal Decree no. 39 of 2005).

Apostasy.

Zina carries the death penalty as hadd for married persons (and lashing for unmarried persons), under demanding evidentiary showings. For a fuller explanation, see our comments.

Consensual Sexual Relations Between Adults of Same Sex.

In Saudi Arabia, individuals can be and have been sentenced to death and executed for apostasy. Although there is no contemporary consensus on the treatment of apostasy, it is punishable by death in Saudi Arabia. The death penalty for apostasy may be ta’zir, as the Hanbali school does not consider apostasy to carry a hadd punishment, while still allowing for the death penalty. Traditionally, apostates are afforded a period of time to turn back to Islam, but the death penalty still applies under this rule (in jurisdictions that provide for it)—an individual who persists in his opinion will be executed, thus, there is ultimately no freedom to publically adhere to a divergent opinion without being executed.

Treason.

Judges reportedly treat gay and lesbian sexual relations as zina, applying the penalty of death or lashing according to the circumstances. The schools of Sunni Islam take different positions on the treatment of homosexual and lesbian acts. The Hanbali school treated male sodomy as carrying the penalty of death as hadd, regardless of the marital status of the offender, while lesbianism was punished (under all schools) as a ta’zir offense. In this regard, Saudi jurisprudence is heterodox in that it treats lesbianism as punishable as hadd. The evidentiary requirements for inflicting a hadd penalty are demanding—for further explanation, see our comments.

Espionage.

We did not find any codified law on the offense of treason. The conditions under which treason was historically punished by death have been limited. Some scholars have confused the hadd penalty of death for rebellion—which was seen as treason—as a judicially enforceable penalty, but a discussion of the offense of rebellion shows that the hadd penalty, as conceived of by most schools, simply included the right of the ruler to kill when necessary in subduing a rebellion, which might include the right to pursue and dispatch fleeing rebels. Judicially inflicting the death penalty as hadd would require a finding that the rebel was actually spreading “corruption on earth” due to his actions (such as spreading terror) or because the rebel did not espouse a reasonably legitimate cause. This proof is not as simple as demonstrating that the rebel opposed a just authority—and in fact, for most schools (historically) the finding did not turn on whether the authority was just or the rebel was correct. In some cases, groups with heterodox beliefs may have been considered rebels, or, instead, corrupt on earth (these are not the same), although whether this carried a judicial penalty is unclear from the sources we referenced. The Hanbali school of law does not treat rebellion as carrying religiously stipulated penalties, so it may be that the death penalty for treason in Saudi Arabia is awarded as hadd when the offenders are guilty of spreading corruption on earth or as ta’zir if they are simply guilty of rebellion. Amnesty International suggests that the category of “corrupt on earth” is used as a justification for ta’zir punishment of political crimes, and does not differentiate between rebellion and corruption on earth; we are not sure whether this is due to a lack of clarity about the law or to judicial practices. It might be likely that the death penalty as hadd for treasonable offenses would usually be construed as a penalty for terrorism.

Military Offenses Not Resulting in Death.

The death penalty might be applied as ta'zir for espionage.

Other Offenses Not Resulting in Death.

Offenses such as treason and disloyalty are punished severely; other offenses would seem not to carry the death penalty (except when falling under the jurisdiction of a Sharia court, which might apply the death penalty). We did not find any recent statutory law or description of the punishment of offenses by military personnel.
.

Yes. Saudi jurists apply the mandatory death penalty for a wide range of offenses, although traditionally each mandatory death penalty is different in its application.

Hudud offenses are considered claims of God, and are described in the Quran, although the penalty for a hadd (singular) offense is usually found in the Sunna. These penalties can “neither be reduced nor augmented.” A hadd penalty should not be awarded unless stringent evidentiary requirements are met, and scholars point out rules suggesting that courts should avoid applying hudud penalties whenever possible. To some extent, this can limit the mandatory nature of the death penalty for hadd offenses, by making it extremely difficult to apply them. It might be possible for Saudi courts to achieve a discretionary, non-arbitrary standard by limiting application of hudud penalties to cases that are particularly egregious and unmitigated by any form of doubt, but we have seen no evidence that Saudi courts apply hadd penalties in a narrow, non-arbitrary fashion—so the death penalty as hadd can be considered mandatory in Saudi Arabia.

Qisas offenses are considered offenses against the individual’s body (such as murder or harm), and some presumptive penalties (and alternatives) are described in the Quran and developed in the Sunna and schools of Islam. These penalties are mandatory in that the victim’s kin (in the case of murder) can freely forgive the murderer or demand compensation in lieu of execution, but otherwise the death penalty is awarded as qisas, ultimately rendering the sentencing decision a non-judicial decision. Under the Hanbali school, traditionally if any heir did not agree to forgive the offender, blood money was payable, and a similar rule may apply in Saudi Arabia. In any case a review of “intentional” murders for which the offenders face the death penalty unless they reach a private settlement with the family will illustrate the degree to which this system fails to incorporate a discretionary aspect that considers relevant factors such as the offender’s culpability and the nature of the offense. At least one scholar has described how Shari’a courts might use discretionary sentencing while still allowing for the qisas-diya system for murder, but there is currently no argument that the Saudi system incorporates a non-arbitrary discretionary aspect to sentencing for murder. The death penalty as qisas is mandatory in Saudi Arabia.

Some penalties might be considered hadd or ta’zir, but in any case as codified the mandatory death penalty applies.

Finally, ta’zir penalties are discretionary (unless they are, by a statute, defined as mandatory), but it is relevant whether courts apply the death penalty in a mandatory fashion. For instance, the death penalty for apostasy is ta’zir under the Hanbali school, but the traditional Hanbali position was still that the death penalty should be applied. Commentary in Al-Adl, a journal published by the Saudi Ministry of Justice, indicates some disagreement over whether the death penalty for some recidivist offenses is hadd or ta’zir. While we do not enumerate these as carrying the mandatory death penalty, further research could show that the death penalty is applied in a mandatory fashion for these or other offenses. Arbitrariness or unequal treatment of different defendants due to different standards of judging during the trial might be limited by the requirement of unanimity among 5-judge appeals panels charged with confirming the death penalty for discretionary sentences —presumably, this requirement could conform sentencing to discretionary standards, but it might not if judges agreed that a ta’zir offense should carry the death penalty regardless of individual circumstances.

Aggravated Murder.

Aggravated murder may be punishable by death as both hadd and qisas.

Murder.

Murder is punishable by death as qisas.

Other Offenses Resulting in Death.

Killing without intent may be punishable by death as hadd, but probably not as qisas. The penalty may apply to all participants in an armed robbery resulting in death, regardless of individual cause or intent."

Terrorism-Related Offenses Resulting in Death.

By Fatwa issued on August 30, 1988, acts of terrorism (as “corruption on earth”) carry the mandatory death penalty; the ambit of this Fatwa is unclear.

Terrorism-Related Offenses Not Resulting in Death.

By Fatwa issued on August 30, 1988, acts of terrorism (as “corruption on earth”) carry the statutory mandatory death penalty; the Fatwa does not specify that such acts must result in death, and its ambit is unclear.

Rape Not Resulting in Death.

Rape is punishable by death as hadd or ta’zir, depending on proof.

Adultery.

Consensual Sexual Relations Between Adults of Same Sex.

Zina carries the death penalty as hadd for married persons (and lashing for unmarried persons), under demanding evidentiary showings. Under traditional rules (discussed in the preceding questions and their Comments), execution of a death sentence for adultery might be unlikely."

Treason.

Judges reportedly treat gay and lesbian sexual relations as zina, applying the penalty of death or lashing according to the circumstances. In Saudi Arabia, the death penalty for homosexual sodomy or lesbianism applies as hadd, depending on proof.

Pregnant Women.

The execution of pregnant women is anathema to the rights of the child set forth in the Quran and Sunna, although the woman may be sentenced to death. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has ratified the Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, which prohibits execution of pregnant women as contrary to the interests of the infant.

Women With Small Children.

The execution of nursing women is anathema to the rights of the child (until the child is two years old) set forth in the Quran and Sunna, although the woman may be sentenced to death. Saudi Arabia has ratified the Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004), which prohibits execution of nursing women as contrary to the interests of the infant for at least two years after giving birth.

Mentally Ill.

Saudi courts appear to recognize that under limited circumstances, a person who does not have mental awareness of the consequences of his acts is not criminally responsible beyond payment of compensation. Those who are aware of the bad consequences of their acts but unable to control their behavior due to insanity might not be excepted from hadd (mandatory) or qisas punishments but can be excepted from tazir (discretionary) punishments. Those who are insane but could be argued to have the ability to control their actions might not be excused from punishment. The extent to which an individual’s judgment is compromised by his mental illness is a question that is left to the courts to determine, and not all individuals with mental illnesses are excluded from the death penalty. One judge, for example, recently wrote about his decision to sentence a man with a schizophrenic disorder to death as qisas for murder (focusing somewhat on the interaction of self-medication attempts with the individual’s illness).

Individuals Below Age 18 at Time of Crime.

Under Shari’a law, which determines the applicability of the death penalty, juveniles are excluded from the death penalty until they reach puberty. Shari’a law outlines three stages of life: 1) age birth to seven where the child is immune to criminal responsibility but not civil, 2) age seven to puberty where a child can receive a taz’ir punishment, and 3) age of puberty and on, where an individual is recognized as an adult, has criminal responsibility, and can receive hadd and qisas punishments.  The line between the second and third stage is often blurred, which subjects more minors to the death penalty. Puberty is often determined by age, signs of puberty, or both, but Saudi judges exercise wide discretion when determining if someone is the age of puberty.


 Saudi Arabia passed the Juvenile Law of 2018 which defines juveniles as “every male or female who has completed the age of seven and has not yet completed eighteen years of age.” Article 15 of the Juvenile Law provides alternative punishments to the death penalty for juveniles under 18. Article 15 also states that if the juvenile defendant is over the age of 15, and the crime typically requires the death penalty, the juvenile should be admitted to a detention center for a period not exceeding 10 years. However, Article 16 of the Juvenile Law limits Article 15’s provisions for juvenile defendants in certain circumstances, including hadd or qisas crimes. This exception leaves Shari’a law’s puberty standard for determining juvenility superior for hadd and qisas crimes. Consequently, for hadd or qisas crimes, judges have discretion in determining whether someone is a juvenile and therefore whether they are eligible for the death penalty. 


In 2020, Saudi Arabia enacted Royal Decree No. 46274. The Saudi Commission on Human Rights stated that the Royal Decree would abolish the practice of executing minors and individuals who committed their offense when they were minors. Despite its façade, the Royal Decree did not abolish the execution of minors. While the Decree retroactively applies the Juvenile Law of 2018 for taz’ir crimes and prevents the application of the death penalty for terrorism-related offenses, it maintains exceptions for hadd and qisas crimes. These exceptions leave juveniles convicted of qisas or hudud subject to the death penalty.  The application of the Royal Decree continues to be uncertain as the text has yet to be published as of 2023. The analysis of the Decree presented here is based on the European Saudi Organization for Human Rights’ analysis of leaked copies. 


In addition to domestic laws claiming to abolish the death penalty for minors, Saudi Arabia ratified multiple international conventions defining juvenility and banning the death penalty for minors. Saudi Arabia ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that “capital punishment should not be imposed for offenses committed by persons below eighteen years of age,” however it entered “reservations with respect to all such articles as are in conflict with the provisions of Islamic law.” The Convention on the Rights of the Child also defines child as, “every human being below the age of 18 years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.” Additionally, the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights, which Saudi Arabia has ratified, prohibits the execution of persons  under the age of 18. Saudi Arabia is also a party to the Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam; however, this covenant might not prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders. Article 1 defines a child as someone who has not yet reached “maturity” while Article 19 provides rules for children in the criminal and civil justice system. Article 19 does not address the death penalty, but provides that “[p]unishment shall be considered as a means of reform and care in order to rehabilitate the child and reintegrate him/her into the society.” 


Although Saudi Arabia has enacted the Juvenile Law, Royal Decree and is a member of multiple international conventions, they continue to sentence juveniles to death. Reprieve and ESOHR documented 15 executions of juvenile defendants between 2010 and 2021. Seven of the fifteen were enforced after the Juvenile Law of 2018 was enacted, and all of them were qisas (discretionary) death sentences. One execution was after the Royal Decree in 2020. The last known juvenile executed in Saudia Arabia was Mustafa al-Darwish in June 2021 for protest-related offenses committed when he was 17. His death sentence was discretionary. 


Saudi authorities continue to promise implementation of the Juvenile Law and that the 2020 Royal Decree comprehensively abolishes the death penalty for children, but the reality is mixed. There was hope for implementation of the new laws when four young men sentenced to death for crimes committed when they were juveniles were resentenced to 10 years in prison. However, the Public Prosecutor continues to seek the death penalty against child defendants, and there are recent  cases of juveniles being sentenced to death. Abdullah al-Howaiti has been sentenced to death twice, both after the Royal Decree, despite being 14 years old at the time of the alleged offences. The Supreme Court quashed his hadd death sentence and remanded the case, but then he received a retributive death sentence at retrial. Jalal al-Labad, Abdullah al-Derazi, Hassan al-Faraj, Youssef al-Manasef, Ali al-Mabiyouq, Abdullah al-Huwaiti, Jawad Qureiris, Ali Hassan al-Subaiti and Mahdi al-Mohsen, are nine men currently at risk of execution for crimes they committed when they were juveniles.

Aggravated Murder.

.

Murder.

.

Other Offenses Resulting in Death.

Such as robbery resulting in death.

Terrorism-Related Offenses Resulting in Death.

.

Terrorism-Related Offenses Not Resulting in Death.

.

Rape Not Resulting in Death.

.

Robbery Not Resulting in Death.

.

Kidnapping Not Resulting in Death.

.

Drug Trafficking Resulting in Death.

.

Drug Trafficking Not Resulting in Death.

.

Adultery.

.

Apostasy.

.

Other Offenses Not Resulting in Death.

These include witchcraft, sorcery, and attempted rape.

Comments.

Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s top executioners. In 2018, out of 149 executions 85 were for murder, 60 for drug-related crimes, one for armed robbery, one for kidnapping and torture, one for rape, and one for terrorism. In 2017, out of 146 executions, 78 were for murder, 59 for drug-related crimes, four for terrorism-related offenses, two for kidnapping and torture, two for rape, and one for witchcraft, sorcery, and adultery.

While we have not been able to access court decisions in death penalty cases, we have found judge-driven academic discussions regarding disagreements as to whether the death penalty is religiously stipulated (hadd) or discretionary (ta’zir) for apostasy, recidivist alcohol or cannabis use, and theft, and rebellion or corruption on earth (although the latter are most likely treated as ta’zir). These debates also suggest that anti-drug laws may be applied expansively, and that protections for those with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities are governed by their ability to understand right and wrong. For example, Judge Hannee bin Abdullah Muhammad Al-Jubair argued that “the applicable limit of mental power is the distinction between good and bad things and orientation to surroundings,” meaning that a “person who has no mental power to comprehend the bad consequences of his acts is not considered responsible for his wrong acts except in cases of financial compensation…a sane person with free will is responsible for his acts.” Specifically, a disorder that (i) deprives a person of will and freedom of action but leaves them with normal mental power and comprehension or (ii) preserves will and comprehension “but may drive a person to act in a way that he may not like to do” will not be a sufficient defense.

The Basic Law provides that “the implementation of [the Basic Law] will not prejudice the treaties and agreements signed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with international bodies and organizations.” This suggests that international human rights agreements entered by Saudi Arabia should have an impact on the application of domestic law. Saudi Arabia has ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights as revised in 2004.

Because Saudi Arabia is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights Committee does not issue decisions on petitions by individuals or Concluding Observations pursuant to periodic review of human rights.


In the past five years, various members of the U.N. have condemned certain aspects of capital punishment in Saudi Arabia on multiple occasions, such as groups of experts comprised of Special Rapporteurs and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet has on recent two occasions published comments to condemn mass executions in Saudi Arabia. In April of 2019, 37 men were executed amidst appeals related to due process violations, ages of those executed, and that most of the men belonged to the Shi’a Muslim minority. Bachelet called this mass execution “shocking” and focused on the abhorrent practice of executing minors. On March 12, 2022, 81 people were executed for terrorism-related charges in a single day, including 41 belonging to the Shiite minority and seven Yemenis. Bachelet expressed grave concern regarding the overbroad definition of terrorism that led to these executions, as well as recommended an immediate halt of the death penalty in Saudi Arabia. 


The Special Procedures of the U.N. Human Rights Council, comprised of subject-matter experts and U.N. Special Rapporteurs, have authored recent press releases to shed light on certain capital practices in Saudi Arabia. Experts called on the Saudi government to release a young man who was only 14 at the time of his alleged crime and faced torture while he awaited execution. After the resuming executions for drug offenses, the Special Procedures called for an immediate reinstatement of the moratorium out of concern for a Jordanian man who facing execution. Lastly, a massive Saudi infrastructure project called NEOM, which seeks to build a vast city from scratch in the desert, resulted in death sentences for tribal members forcibly evicted from the construction site. Special Procedures condemned these death sentences and the terrorism charges they were purportedly based upon.

The Members of the Human Rights Council recommended that Saudi Arabia eliminate the juvenile death penalty, commute the death sentences of those convicted for offenses committed while under the age of 18, restrict the application of the death penalty to the most serious offenses, and institute protections to safeguard the rights of defendants, including safeguards available at international law. The Saudi government accepted the Members’ recommendations that it address these concerns.

According to the Criminal Procedure Code, defendants have a right to an attorney “or representative” during “investigation and trial,” which as of 2010 may be paid for at the state’s expense if the defendant cannot afford one. However, in practice, the right to a lawyer is routinely disregarded. There is no provision requiring that detainees be informed of their right to legal representation. Defendants report never seeing a lawyer throughout the entire investigation phase, or only meeting them very late in the process. Access to legal representation reportedly requires permission of the Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution. The Public Prosecutor has “unconstrained discretion” to prevent lawyer-client communications during investigation and trial.  .

According to the Law on Criminal Procedure, defendants have a right to an attorney during the “investigation and trial stages,” but there is no law that provides for the right to legal representation on appeal.

While individuals have the right to an attorney, reports indicate that the justice system does not enforce this right.  Individuals report never seeing a lawyer throughout the entire investigation phase, or only meeting them very late in the process. The violation of minimum procedural safeguards for defendants’ due process rights, such as torture and the admission of coerced confessions, suggests that such practices are endorsed by the state. For example, Mohammed al-Faraj, who was eligible for the death penalty for non-violent political offenses allegedly committed when he was a minor, was prevented by the court from attending his own hearings and has been unable to contact his lawyer. Another individual, Hussein abo al-Kheir, was not provided a lawyer to represent him during his capital trial for drug charges. Reports indicate that trials held in secrecy before the Specialized Criminal Court often proceed without defense lawyers or in absentia with no effective defense.Many have strongly implored Saudi Arabia to improve its quality of legal representation. One U.N. Special Rapporteur called upon the Saudi government to introduce immediate reforms to guarantee the automatic presence of lawyers after a suspect’s detention and to abolish the existing practice whereby access to legal representation requires the permission of the Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution and can be suspended by the Public Prosecutor at any time. Human Rights Watch similarly recommended that detainees must be promptly allowed to communicate with an attorney prior to interrogation and that detainees should be informed of their right to legal representation. Amnesty International has observed that the right to an attorney is rarely granted to defendants, as some were denied a request for a lawyer without any explanation, told that bringing in a lawyer would “complicate things,” or informed that they could only have a lawyer in court. Additionally, defendants and their lawyers can be denied access to court documents. For instance, one man was executed in May of 2015 even though he was not allowed a lawyer throughout his detention and trial, and the court had refused to provide him a copy of the charge sheet and court verdict. Access to a lawyer is also undermined by the government’s failure to provide adequate interpretation services for foreign defendants.

Five-judge criminal appellate courts review death sentences, stoning, amputation, and qisas sentences other than death. Any party to the case – accused, prosecutor, or claimant – may appeal any judgment. The appellate court may allow the parties to submit new evidence on appeal. A death sentence is not final until the Permanent Panel of the Supreme Judicial Council, or Supreme Court, confirms it. If the Permanent Panel declines to affirm the sentence, then the case is remanded.Appeals must be filed within 30 days of receipt of the judgment. After 45 days, with or without the defendant’s filed appeal, the appellate court must automatically review a death sentence. Human Rights Watch reported in 2010 that ta’zir (discretionary) death sentences require that the appellate court unanimously confirm. While Saudi Arabia claims that the death penalty is only carried out after being confirmed by the Supreme Court, in practice Amnesty International has concluded that the process of appeal is merely a formality rather than a thorough review process. The Supreme Court is constrained to procedural review and application of Islamic law, and does not review issues of fact or evidence.

Traditionally, the ruler’s ability to pardon hudud penalties is limited, although penalties can be suspended in some circumstances. Qisas penalties are usually pardoned by the victim’s family, not the ruler. Ta’zir penalties may be pardoned by the public authority. That is the background for the Saudi laws on this matter.

Under Article 220 of the Law on Criminal Procedure, no sentence of death can be executed except pursuant to a Royal Order “issued by the King or his authorized representative.” Under Articles 22 and 23, “public criminal action” (hadd or tazir penalties) lapses upon pardon by the King (or in some cases upon repentance, where pardon would be judicially granted), but “private criminal action” (qisas) carries no hope of government-issued pardon—only the victim’s heirs may pardon the offender, usually after a payment of diyat (blood money). Some public offenses are not pardonable by the King; this implies that while under Article 220 the King need not issue a decree executing a sentence of death as hadd, under Article 22 the King may not be permitted to actually pardon an individual who is under sentence of death awarded as hadd. Pardon may includes the reduction of penalties and is not always a full pardon.

No. “First Instance Courts,” which are comprised of panels of one or three judges, oversee criminal trials. A first instance court called the “General Court,” when convened with three judges, has jurisdiction over capital hadd, qisas, and ta’zir cases. In order to issue the death penalty for ta’zir offenses, the three judges must unanimously agree. In the absence of unanimity, the Minister of Justice will appoint two more judges to the matter and the five-member court may issue a death sentence unanimously or by majority vote. The Criminal Procedure Code also provides that a first-instance court called the Summary Court has jurisdiction over ta’zir (“except those excluded by statutory law”) and hadd cases, but the Code (i) does not specify if or how the Summary Court can impose the death penalty for ta’zir crimes and (ii) does not allow Summary Courts to issue the death penalty for hadd crimes.

There have been many documented due process and human rights violations in the Saudi criminal justice system. People are arrested without a warrant, not informed of the charges against them, held incommunicado (sometimes in solitary confinement and usually without access to their families or a lawyer), tortured or otherwise ill-treated in pre-trial detention, held without charge or trial, and left with no opportunity to challenge the legality of their detention. Some individuals are sentenced to death, on vague, “catch-all” charges that criminalize peaceful opposition or free expression as “terrorism.” Harm Reduction International has reported mass trials, summary trials, and abuses of due process standards, such as denying interpretation services and consular access to foreign nationals. The European-Saudi Organisation for Human Rights has also documented several trials held at the Specialized Criminal Court (“SCC”) that did not meet international standards of fairness and due process. The SCC – which was originally created to adjudicate terrorism cases but now tries increasing numbers of human rights defenders, protesters, journalists, and minors – has no codified jurisdiction, lacks judicial independence, and is heavily controlled by the state. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism released a report in December 2018 detailing concern over use of the death penalty after “manifestly unfair trials,” unfair and secret trials before the Specialized Criminal Court, prolonged detention, use of torture, and the practice of coercing confessions and admitting such confessions into evidence. The abuses of fundamental rights rife in secret trials are compounded by detention practices that violate human rights, such as holding detainees incommunicado or in secret detention without legal representation. Reprieve and the European-Saudi Organisation for Human Rights (“ESOHR”) reported in June 2021 that Saudi Arabia continues to fail to improve the transparency and openness of legal proceedings or investigations. In 2019, the ESOHR and Harm Reduction International reported that torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment were still common practices in Saudi Arabia. Judges often rely on forced confessions and routinely ignore defendant’s allegations of torture. Executions by beheading are sometimes public, which have been deemed cruel and inhuman. It has also been documented that Saudi Arabia has withheld bodies after executions—at least 32 bodies had not been returned to their families as of January 2019. The nature of ta’zir offenses creates a system of arbitrariness that lacks basic justice. Shari’a law as practiced in Saudi Arabia is clear on hudud and qisas, however the majority of contemporary criminal cases that fall under the category of ta’zir crimes give immense discretion to judges in determining what constitutes a crime and appropriate sentence, without being bound by judicial precedent. The absence of a rule to abide by judicial precedent creates arbitrariness in sentences and punishments issued by different judges for the same type of offenses across cases. Further, the approach to sentencing for ta’zir crimes does not always meet fair trial standards. If a defendant stands trial and successfully convinces one of three judges that he should not be executed for a ta’zir offense, Saudi law requires that two additional judges be appointed to consider the matter along with the original 3-judge panel. A simple majority of the new panel of five judges may sentence the defendant to death.

Saudi Arabia has “political prisons” as well as separate “general prisons,” though sometimes both types of prisoners are held in the same facility. Considering that terrorism convictions can carry the death penalty, there could be individuals under sentence of death in either type of prison. Political prisons are maintained by the Presidency of State Security and they are regarded as maximum security. 

We did not find information on where prisoners are held under sentence of death in Saudi Arabia, but we believe there may be several locations. Prisoners on death row in Saudi Arabia are not kept separately from the general population. They sleep in communal cells with other inmates.

While there is typically very little information available about prison conditions in Saudi Arabia, ALQST has recently published a report thoroughly examining the prison system in Saudi Arabia based on significant surveys of inmates and their relatives. Overall, ALQST remarks that “the reality of conditions in Saudi Arabia’s political prisons is far less rosy than the whitewashing efforts of state institutions and local media would have us believe.” Poor prison conditions have resulted in multiple reported deaths.


Saudi Arabia has political prisons as well as separate general prisons, though sometimes both types of prisoners are held in the same facility. Considering that terrorism convictions can carry the death penalty, there could be individuals under sentence of death in either type of prison. Political prisons are maintained by the Presidency of State Security and they are regarded as maximum security. Items like books, newspapers, and notebooks are banned for some prisoners.


Prison conditions vary from facility to facility, yet most Saudi prisons subject inmates to poor and inadequate conditions. Prisons consistently have poor infrastructure and maintenance, insufficient nutrition, inadequate hygiene, lack of facilities for nursing mothers, limited access to daily exercise or fresh air, overcrowding, unavailability of essential personal hygiene items, and verbal and physical abuse by correctional officers and other prisoners. Prisoners often suffer from chronic illness or mental health problems, but receive inadequate medical care. Furthermore, torture is “systematic” in Saudi prisons. Prisoners can be subjected to sleep deprivation, stress positions, denial of food and drink, loud noises, and hooding.
.

Yes, although exact numbers are difficult to confirm. Foreign nationals comprise a disproportionate number of death-sentenced prisoners in Saudi Arabia, which is home to the third largest population of foreign nationals in the world. For example, Yemeni nationals are 2.87% of Saudi Arabia’s population, but comprise 7.41% of executions. Foreign nationals experience high levels of exploitation and abuse with few legal protections. From 2010-2021, Reprieve found that Saudi Arabia executed 490 foreign nationals.


Poor migrant workers are more at risk of being sentenced to death because they often lack the language skills and other knowledge necessary for their defense, and Saudi Arabia does not always provide a free interpreter or consular assistance to criminal defendants, in violation of international law. Migrant workers also are particularly vulnerable because they lack the relationships and resources that would allow them to obtain a pardon, which, through the practice of diya, is often granted only to those who are able to influence the victim’s family through kinship or friendship as well as large sums of money.


In July 2023, the European-Saudi Organisation on Human Rights calculated that there were 61 executions in the first six months of 2023, including 15 foreign nationals from Bahrain, Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Yemen. As of mid-2023, at least 64 detainees were on death row in Saudi Arabia.
(This question was last updated on November 3, 2023.).

It is unclear how many foreign nationals are on death row. The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has previously expressed its concern over the large numbers of foreign nationals among those sentenced to death in Saudi Arabia. In July 2023, the European-Saudi Organisation on Human Rights calculated that there were 61 executions in the first six months of 2023, including 15 foreign nationals from Bahrain, Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Yemen. As of mid-2023, at least 64 detainees were on death row in Saudi Arabia.

In 2022, Saudi Arabia executed people from the following countries: Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Jordan, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine (State of), Syria, and Yemen. Yemenis were more frequently executed than any other nationality, which is reflective of the broader measures undertaken by the Saudi government to target Yemeni nationals in the wake of the conflict between the two countries. In July 2023, the European-Saudi Organisation on Human Rights calculated that the first six months of 2023 contained 61 executions, including 15 foreign nationals from Bahrain, Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Yemen. 

(This question was last updated on November 3, 2023.).

 Due to secrecy surrounding the death penalty in Saudi Arabia, we are unable to confirm the current number of women on death row. Reprieve recorded 31 executions of women between 2010 and 2021. The overwhelming majority of executed women were foreign nationals (23), at least one was a minor at the time of the offense, and three were executed for non-lethal crimes (narcotics and witchcraft).


In 2022, the Saudi Press Agency reported the execution of one woman. One woman was also executed in 2021. There was a significant decrease in executions due to the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, but, yet two of the twenty-seven executed people were women. In 2019, Saudi Arabia executed a Filipina domestic worker for murder.

There are multiple cases of death row prisoners who were sentenced as juveniles despite a 2018 law meant to limit the practice. In August 2018, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud enacted a new law on juveniles, which prescribes a maximum prison sentence of 10 years for individuals under 18 years of age in cases where discretionary (ta’zir) death sentences could otherwise apply. Under the new law, however, juveniles can still receive the death penalty for hadd offenses (fixed punishments under Shariah law) or crimes punishable by qisas (retaliatory punishment). Saudi Arabia has also ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which clearly prohibits the imposition of capital punishment on those under 18, yet it entered “reservations with respect to all such articles as are in conflict with the provisions of Islamic law.”


As of May 2023, at least nine young men who were juveniles at the time of their crimes were on death row. As of June 2023, Amnesty International reported grave concern about the imminent risk of execution for seven young men convicted of ta’zir (discretionary) crimes, meaning that their death sentences are in direct contravention of the new law. Furthermore, six of the seven young men are from the Shi’a minority and have faced grossly unfair trials and treatment, which is demonstrative of the broader human rights issues plaguing the Saudi system. At the end of October 2023, two young men who were under the age of 18 at the time of their alleged crimes were at risk of imminent execution.

There is little information available about the racial/ethnic composition of death row inmates in Saudi Arabia. However, multiple organizations have documented the disproportionate number of foreign nationals (see Question 6.3 above for details) and Shia Muslims in executions in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia continues to be one of the top executioners in the world. Despite promises of reform and modernization made by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who was appointed in 2017, executions rates have increased. During Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s first eight months in power, executions in Saudi Arabia doubled: there were 133 executions between June 2017 and March 2018, compared to 67 in the eight previous months. Between 5 November 2018 and June 2023, Saudi authorities executed 556 people. In 2022 alone, the Saudi Human Rights Commission recorded 196 executions—the highest number in 30 years. In 2018, the former U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, reported to the U.N. Human Rights Council that “the use by Saudi Arabia of the death penalty is archaic, and inhuman and degrading, not only for the person who is executed but for all those who contribute to it and who take part as spectators.”

As of 2023, Saudi Arabia continues to impose the death penalty as tool of political repression against the Shi’a minority, human rights defenders, and peaceful activists. Mass capital trials and mass executions also continued. In March 2022, Saudi Arabia carried out the largest mass execution in years, which killed 81 people—41 of whom were Shi’a Muslims.  In April 2019, Saudi Arabia carried out a mass execution of 37 people convicted of protest-related offenses, including 33 members of the country’s Shi’a minority and a young man who was under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offense. The Specialized Criminal Court convicted 25 of the 37 men in two mass trials, dismissing allegations of torture and forced confessions. in 2016, Saudi Arabia executed 47 people in one day, including Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr.

Amnesty International has reported that Saudi authorities often fail to comply with fair trial standards in capital cases, which are often held in secret. Capital defendants are often held incommunicado and lack access to legal assistance and translation services. One of the hallmarks of the new era of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been the systematic use of torture on detainees. Authorities regularly extract confessions through torture, which become the basis for convictions and death sentences. By the end of 2022, Saudi Arabia continued to impose death sentences and carry out executions for crimes that did not involve intentional killing, such as drug-related offences, kidnapping, rape, and treason.

In August 2018, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud enacted a new law on juveniles. This law prescribes a maximum prison sentence of 10 years for individuals under 18 years of age in cases where discretionary death sentences could apply. Under the new law, however, juveniles can still get the death penalty for hadd offenses (fixed punishments under Shariah law) or crimes punishable by qisas (retaliatory punishment). While this law prohibits the death penalty for ta’zir offenses, at least seven juveniles with ta’zir death sentences remain on death row, suggesting that the law on juveniles is nothing more than a facade. At the end of October 2023, two young men who were under the age of 18 at the time of their alleged crimes were at risk of imminent execution.

A Specialized Criminal Court (“SCC”) was established in 2008 to try terrorism cases. This court has increasingly been trying peaceful dissidents and political activists who question abuses of power, including Shi’a activists. There is no published law or statute governing the jurisdiction of the SCC, and so judges are able to criminalize any act based on their own interpretation of Shari’a law, violating the principle of legality. In 2017, a regional analysts suggested that a visit from US President Donald Trump to Saudi Arabia may have emboldened Saudi authorities to continue executing political protesters because Trump not only failed to comment on the human rights abuses of the country, but also commented that he was impressed with the lack of protesters on the streets.

(This question was last updated on October 31, 2023.).

None.

European Saudi Organization for Human Rights (ESOHR)https://www.esohr.org/en/%d8%ad%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%86%d8%b8%d9%85%d8%a9/

Reprieve
PO Box 72054
London EC3P 3BZ
United Kingdom
Tel 020 7553 8140
Fax 020 7553 8189
info@reprieve.org.uk
http://www.reprieve.org.uk.

It is very difficult to access judicial opinions in general, even in-country and in-person.

We did not find any electronic resources for accessing court judgments. NYU Law’s GlobaLex page provides useful links to law-related resources and scholarship: http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Saudi_Arabia.html. 

The Al-Adl Journal (published by the Ministry of Justice) posts some recent judge-driven discussions. The Journal was available online, but the URL changed during our research. It may remain available via an internet search.

Amnesty Intl., Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent, MDE 23/6936/2023, Jul. 2023 

Reprieve, Bloodshed and Lies: Mohammed bin Salman’s Kingdom of Executions, 2023 

European Saudi Organization for Human Rights, The Legality of Child Executions in Saudi Arabia: Analysis of the 2018 Juvenile Law and 2020 Royal Decree, https://www.esohr.org/en/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B7%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84/ Jun. 20, 2022 

U.S. Dept. of State, Saudi Arabia 2022 Human Rights Report, https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/saudi-arabia/ 

ALQST For Human Rights, Shrouded in Secrecy: Prisons and Detention Centres in Saudi Arabia, https://www.alqst.org/en/posts/600, Jul. 27, 2021 

Reprieve & European Saudi Organization for Human Rights, Mid-term report for the Universal Periodic Review of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, https://reprieve.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/06/2021_06_05_Report_UniversalPeriodicReview_SaudiArabia.pdf, Jun. 5, 2021 

European-Saudi Organization for Human Rights, 2018 Death Penalty Report: Saudi Arabia’s False Promise, https://www.esohr.org/en/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D9%8A-2018-%D9%88%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A/#:~:text=Between%202011%20and%202018%2C%20the,%2C%20raids%2C%20and%20prison%20killings., Jan. 16, 2019 

Human Rights Watch, The High Cost of Change: Repression Under Saudi Crown Prince Tarnishes Reforms, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/saudi1119_web_0.pdf, Oct. 2019 

Giada Girelli, The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: Global Overview 2018, Harm Reduction Intl., https://www.hri.global/files/2019/02/22/HRI_DeathPenaltyReport_2019.pdf, Feb. 2019 

U.N.G.A. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/52/Add.2, Dec. 13, 2018 

Amnesty Intl., ‘Killing in the Name of Justice’; The Death Penalty in Saudi Arabia, Aug. 2015 

United Nations Economic and Social Council, Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty, Report of the Secretary-General, E/2015/49, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/DeathPenalty/E-2015-49.pdf, Apr. 13, 2015 

Amnesty Intl., Affront to Justice: Death Penalty in Saudi Arabia, MDE 23/027/2008, Oct. 14, 2008 

Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Death Penalty, Mercy and Islam: A Call for Retrospection, p. 73-105 in Erik C. Owens, et. al., eds., Religion and the Death Penalty: A Call for Reckoning, Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2004 Muhammad Abdel Haleem et. al, Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari’a, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003 

Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Culture of Ugliness in Modern Islam and Reengaging Morality, UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law, Vol. 2 p. 33, 2002-2003 

Robert Postawko, Towards an Islamic Critique of Capital Punishment, UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law, Vol. 1 p. 269, 2002 

Amnesty Intl., Defying World Trends—Saudi Arabia’s Extensive Use of Capital Punishment, MDE 23/015/2001, Nov. 1, 2001

Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press, 2001 

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes and the Criminal Process, Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 12 No. 3, p. 269, 1997 

Tahir Mahmood et. al., Criminal Law in Islam and the Muslim World, Institute of Objective Studies, 1st ed., 1996 

Gerald E. Lampe, ed., Justice and Human Rights in Islamic Law, International Law Institute, 1997 

Rodolphe J.A. De Seife, The Shari’a: An Introduction to the Law of Islam, Austin & Winfield, 1994 

Ali Akram Khan Sherwani, Impact of Islamic Penal Laws on the Traditional Arab Society, M.D. Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1993 

Dr. Nagaty Sanad, The Theory of Crime and Criminal Responsibility in Islamic Law: Shari’a, The Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1991 

M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., The Islamic Criminal Justice System, Oceana Publications, Inc., 1982 

Mohamed S. El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law: A Comparative Study, American Trust Publications, 1982 

Reprieve, Justice Crucified: The Death Penalty in Saudi Arabia, 2015.

S. Mahmassani, Falsafat Al-Tashri Fi Al Islam, Translated by Farhat J. Ziadeh, E.J. Brill, 1961 

Al-Adl Journal online (multiple articles published by the Ministry of Justice, website is variable and is not always available in English—use Google search) .

None.